INTRODUCTION
The rituals that surround the disposal of the dead are one of our species' defining characteristics.
1 As well as the very practical need of having to dispose of a lifeless corpse, death rituals tend to serve many other functions. 2 These range from commemorating the  The initial version of this article analysed the decision of the Administrative Court in Ghai. However, after submission and acceptance of the article, the Court of Appeal upheld Mr Ghai's appeal, though on much narrower grounds, and without needing to consider Administrative Court's approach to article 9 ECHR. At a late stage in the publication process we have endeavoured to incorporate the essence of the Court of Appeal's decision into the text, but the thrust of the article remains a critique of the Administrative Court's approach to the article 9 issues in the case, which remains of interest to scholars of human rights and religion. We should like to thank Graham Ferris and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on the earlier draft. Errors and omissions remain our own. 1 imagination as his modes of disposing of the bodies of his dead ' . 16 Yet whilst these words convey a seemingly immutable truth, British social attitudes to death and related funeral rites have changed significantly in the century since Rivers published his work. For example, today, crematoria are found in practically every town, due to the fact that a majority of British people choose to be cremated in such places after death. But it was not always so. Less than two hundred years ago burial of the dead, rather then cremation, was the norm in Britain. 17 Accordingly, from the period when legal restrictions on cremation were lifted (from 1852-1884), to its ultimate ‗popularisation' (since 1952), the British public's approach to cremation has shifted dramatically. 18 As a consequence, when a person dies today in Britain it is the norm for their body (having been prepared by an undertaker) to be kept in a closed coffin, upheld Mr Ghai's appeal but not on the basis that his article 9 rights had been breached. 34 See note 19, above, at [86] . 35 Ibid, at [101] . 36 Ibid, at [87] . 37 In regard to open air cremation, a great deal of conflicting expert evidence was adduced by both sides in relation to Hindu funerary beliefs and customs. air pyres were only a ‗matter of tradition for Sikhs in India' rather than a tenet of ‗dogma and belief', article 9 accorded them no protection on this issue.
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What was beyond dispute in this case (at first instance) was that by placing curbs on the burning of human remains, the 1902 Act and the 2008 Regulations clearly constituted an interference with the manifestation of a person's belief, contrary to article 9(1) of the ECHR. Accordingly, the next question which had to be answered was whether such a restriction could be justified under article 9(2), as pursuing a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner.
The Secretary of State had originally argued that the ‗legitimate aim' which justified banning open air funeral pyres lay in the need to prevent risks to the environment and threats to the safety of bystanders, due to the release of dioxins, mercury emissions and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons. However, these public health and environmental arguments were abandoned once it was accepted that such concerns could be dealt with through regulation.
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Instead, the Secretary of State proceeded to argue that the ban was justifiable on the basis that it pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public morals and the rights of others, since ‗a large proportion of the population of this country would be upset and offended by open air funeral pyres and would find it abhorrent that human remains were being burned in this manner'.
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The Administrative Court accepted that protecting public morals and the rights of others was indeed a legitimate aim of the ban; but it had next to consider whether the ban constituted a proportionate interference in pursuit of that aim-ie, did the requirement that cremation take place in a building strike a ‗fair balance' between the rights of the claimant and the interests of society? 43 Cranston J, having taken into account various ‗backdrop features' (discussed in part 3 below), and declaring that he intended ‗now [to] meet the 39 Note 19, above, at [16] . 40 Ibid, at [102] . 41 Ibid, at [61] and [105] . 42 than a court. 47 Given that these backdrop features underpin the determination of the article 9 issue in this case, they warrant a more detailed analysis.
i) No blanket interference with the claimant's article 9 rights
The first backdrop feature noted was that there had been ‗no blanket interference with the 
(iii) Cremation law is outdated
The third backdrop factor related to Ghai's submission that the law was outdated because the legal definition of a crematorium (ie, a ‗building fitted with appliances for the purpose of burning human remains') dated back to 1902, and that ‗the balance it struck could no longer be regarded as valid'. 57 With this in mind Cranston J suggested that there was ‗no significant Cremation Regulations had been subject to public consultation, and that faith groups (including the Hindu Forum of Britain), had been sent copies of the Consultation paper. 59 Hindu and other religious groups may indeed have been consulted in relation to cremation practices, but the contention that cultural expectations on any issue have not changed since the Edwardian age is surely doubtful. 60 The last century has witnessed the transformation of Britain from a (predominantly) ethnically and religiously homogenous nation into a racially and religiously diverse society. 61 Indeed, much has already been written on how British attitudes, practices and beliefs about death have undergone significant change in recent decades. 62 Thus, any assumption that cultural norms governing the disposal of the dead are as they were in 1902 is extremely questionable. After all, there have been significant changes in relation to the practice of cremation, not least in relation to the fact that in 1960 less than one in three corpses were cremated, whereas today more than 70 per cent of deaths lead to cremations in Britain. 63 Furthermore, with regard to the 2008 Regulations, it should be noted that the Government consultation paper which preceded them, stated that:
We recognise that some faiths would prefer to cremate the remains of a member of that faith on what is known as a funeral pyre. Any question as to whether the regulations permit funeral pyres is a matter for the courts and outside the scope of these regulations. 64 This certainly would appear to be some kind of (tacit) acknowledgment, by the Government at any rate, that there have indeed been significant cultural changes in this area.
(iv) An absence of any European consensus on funeral pyres
The fourth backdrop factor identified by Cranston J was the absence of any European The fact that it is ‗not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion in society' is certainly something that the European Court of Human Rights takes into account when it chooses to afford states a widened margin of appreciation in cases involving religion. 68 But the issue of funeral pyres has not (as yet) been litigated before the Strasbourg Court. Accordingly, there is no case law on the subject which, by virtue of section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, must be ‗taken into account' by UK courts. 69 The Ghai court, by adopting one aspect of the Strasbourg Court's methodology (which is very much a product of that court's supra-national character), was necessarily tending towards a ‗lowest European common denominator' approach. Such an approach will inevitably lead to a dilution of protection for the right to manifest one's religious belief in the UK. It is surely questionable whether it is appropriate for a national court to count this as one of the factors contributing to its own deferential stance on the question of proportionality. by open air funeral pyres and would find it abhorrent that human remains were being burned in this manner'. 71 While the Secretary of the State will doubtlessly have reflected the views of some, his reasoning can be criticised on the basis that it is questionable whether the proscription of otherwise harmless conduct can ever be justified merely on the grounds that it may cause offence. 72 At the very least there are serious difficulties in assessing whether the (subjective) intensity of perceived offence is sufficient to justify a criminal sanction, because what one person finds offensive ‗may be water off a duck's back to another'. 73 As Joel
Feinberg has convincingly argued, ‗there are abundant reasons ... for being extremely cautious in applying the offense principle'. 74 However, even notwithstanding these difficulties, the kind of offence with which the Administrative Court was concerned was of an exceptionally attenuated variety. In other words, all of the parties accepted that arrangements could have been made whereby there would have been no or very little prospect of anyone witnessing funeral pyres who did not wish to do so. Cremations would be in secluded places, out of public view, and the chance of the public ‗stumbling on a funeral pyre was remote [given that] sufficient signs could be deployed warning people of the site'. 75 What is more, anyone who considered such funeral rites to be offensive, and/or mourners of a ‗sensitive disposition' would be free, quite simply, to absent themselves. 76 The Administrative Court in Ghai was concerned, therefore, not with direct offence being caused to those observing funeral pyres with their own senses but, rather, with a secondary, or indirect, form of offence.
In this regard, perhaps one of the most problematic aspects of Cranston J's ruling was his reliance on the European Court's decision in Otto Preminger Institute v Austria, in which an anti-religious satirical film was banned by the Austrian authorities in the Tyrol region on the basis that it would be offensive to the Roman Catholic majority in the area. 77 The Strasbourg Court held that the ban did not breach the right to freedom of expression under article 10 of the ECHR, since it fell within the state's margin of appreciation, even though the applicants had argued that the film would only be seen by (and therefore risk causing offence to) those who chose to see it. 78 Nevertheless, the European Court held that ‗there was sufficient public knowledge of the basic content of the film to give a clear indication of its nature, such that it was capable in and of itself of causing offence, even though those offended had not been to see it'. 79 Cranston J held that the ‗same principle must apply' to funeral pyres. 80 The distress being prevented was therefore not that of people witnessing at first hand burning human bodies, but rather the sensibilities of people who would find the mere idea of funeral pyres ‗in and of it itself' offensive. is he who suffers acute disgust and revulsion, shock to sensibilities, shameful 75 Note 19, above, at [108] . 76 Ibid. 77 Otto Preminger Institute v Austria (1994) 19 EHRR 34. 78 The film could only be watched at the applicant's ‗art house' cinema (which had a narrow specialist clientele), on payment of a fee by those who were over 17 years of age. embarrassment, annoyance, frustration, resentment or humiliation not from something he sees, feels, smells or hears, but rather from unseen activities he knows or fears may be happening beyond his ken...
If -bare knowledge‖ that discreet and harmless -immoralities‖ are occurring in private leads to severe mental distress, we should attribute the distress to abnormal susceptibilities rather than the precipitating cause. We don't punish persons when their normally harmless and independently valuable (at least to themselves) activities happen to startle a skittish horse whose presence was unsuspected. Rather we expect owners of skittish horses to keep them away from -startling‖ activities and to take steps to cure their skittishness.
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The Administrative Court's decision in Ghai does just this -it protects the sensibilities of the most queasy, the ‗most skittish' in the population at the expense of the profoundly held beliefs of the individual.
A further criticism of this aspect of the Administrative Court's approach in Ghai is that it is highly questionable whether people have the right not to be offended as asserted in rights'. 86 There seems, therefore, to be a requirement that in order for interference with freedom of expression to be justified, the offence caused to religious sensibilities must be gratuitous.
In stark contrast, the Administrative Court in Ghai accepted that the claimant genuinely believed that open air cremation was a vital part of his cycle of existence, denial of which would have ‗devastating consequences' for him in the afterlife. 87 On the Court's own finding, Mr Ghai could in no way be described as requiring a funeral pyre just for the sake of it, gratuitously. 88 His reasons were of absolute centrality to his existence. Even if it had been accepted that others would (or could) be offended by the knowledge of funeral pyres taking place, it could not even remotely be contended that such offence would be caused ‗gratuitously', a requirement which the European Court's test in Otto Preminger seems to demand.
Cranston J relied heavily on Otto Preminger in Ghai, but it is important to note that the European Court has apparently moved away from Otto Preminger in recent years. Today it is doubtful whether article 9 affords protection to one's religious feelings over and above other kinds of offence. 89 Yet, even if this is not the case and the Otto-Preminger test ought to still be employed, 90 there is no suggestion in Ghai that it was specifically religious feelings that were being protected. It is significant that at no point in the judgment was any attempt made to explain the exact kind of offence that the cremation ban was intended to prevent.
Presumably it was just a vague sense of public disgust or queasiness at the very thought of human remains being burnt in an open funeral pyre − an example of what has been termed the ‗yuck factor'. 91 Yet this is surely far removed from extreme or gratuitous offence being caused to religious convictions, which was supposedly at issue in Otto Preminger.
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'Engagement with the political, not the judicial, process'?
It will be recalled that these backdrop features led directly to the Administrative Court's conclusion that this was a matter more appropriate for resolution by ‗elected representatives' than a court. Consequently it was suggested that the applicant pursue his case by political rather than legal means, by lobbying and campaigning to change the legislative framework. Certainly, this is an area which demands a careful and balanced approach, with due regard accorded to cultural and religious sensitivities. It probably is the case that the best forum for ultimately striking this kind of balance act is the political. But reliance on these arguments-that the appropriate process by which this issue should be addressed was not the judicial, but the political-resulted, in Ghai, in the Administrative Court wholly failing to carry out the task of weighing the competing factors itself. It effectively abrogated its decision making power, handing it over wholesale to the elected arms of governance. This appears to come close to that very majoritarianism that the legal protection of human rights in a liberal democracy is intended to forestall.
It is perhaps a trite point, but the Human Rights Act 1998 does not give courts the power to ‗strike down' primary legislation. The Act preserves the sovereignty of Parliament.
Some have argued, however, that the HRA does provide the mechanisms by which a kind of constitutional dialogue may take place in which the courts are able to initiate a ‗conversation'
with the other arms of governance as to the precise scope and content of Convention rights.
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With this in mind, it is important to remember that even if the Administrative or the Appeal 
CREMATION, CULTURE AND THE COMMON LAW
It is worth recalling that in Mr Ghai's case, the followers of his ‗strand of orthodox Hinduism' 95 believe that fire is the embodiment of the god Agni, and that their failure to perform a final sacrifice to him, by way of cremation on an outdoor funeral pyre (in strict accordance with the Vedic texts), will interrupt the cycle of birth/rebirth and harm the future course of the soul, perhaps irrevocably. 96 The Administrative Court agreed that the performance of anthyesthi sanskara was a manifestation of the claimant's religious belief, and accepted that it was his ‗genuine belief, held in good faith' that were he not to be cremated on an open air funeral pyre there would be devastating results for him in the afterlife. 97 However, and the point bears repetition, having acknowledged the absolute centrality of anthyesthi sanskara to the claimant's most fundamental beliefs, the Administrative Court then accepted the necessity of prohibiting this ritual merely in order to prevent offence to those who were not even going to witness it at first hand.
In effect the Administrative Court was saying: ‗We accept that you believe this ritual is crucial to your existence; and it is certainly not appropriate for us to inquire into the validity of your belief. And when it comes to manifesting your belief, as long as it's not trivial and makes sense, we are not going to probe too deeply'. But then, at the pivotal point in its analysis, when the proportionality of the state's interference with the fundamental right was to be assessed, and the manifestation of Ghai's belief had to be weighed against the public good, the Court was prepared to accept that the prevention of an attenuated form of secondary offence justified the prohibition of (what it had already accepted was) a subjectively crucial sacrament.
The Administrative Court's reasoning and decision in Ghai perhaps indicate a judicial reluctance to empathise with patterns of religious unorthodoxy, and a failure to take the imaginative leap of seeing the world from the perspective of the other, especially those whose beliefs it cannot even come close to comprehending. 98 As long ago as the seventeenth century, Pierre Bayle used the technique of imagining the world from the perspective of those with other faiths as a means of forcing his opponents to confront the consequences of their own intolerance. 99 More recently, Conor Gearty has argued that compassion might be a term upon which our modern human rights vocabulary could be built, because compassion has ‗a cognitive element (understanding the other), an affective element (feeling for the other) and a voluntarist element (doing something about the other).' 100 In a similar vein, Richard Rorty has argued that we need an increase in sentimental education, a need of a ‗progress of sentiments' leading to ‗an increasing ability to see the similarities between ourselves and people very unlike us as outweighing the differences'. 101 Thus, were the Administrative Court Victorian jurist, James Fitzjames Stephen, in adjudicating on the matter, directed the jury that a person who burns instead of burying a dead body did not commit an offence, unless he acted in such a manner as to amount to a public nuisance at common law.
It is not my place to offer any opinion on the comparative merits of burning and burying corpses, but before I could hold that it must be a misdemeanor to burn a dead body, I must be satisfied not only that some people, or even that many people, object to the practice, but that it is, on plain, undeniable grounds, highly mischievous or view of a ‗good death' 106 seems very different from such notions today in contemporary Britain. 107 Thus, it is all the more surprising that the 19 th century common law position in respect of funeral rites appears more progressive than has (hitherto) been the case under the Human Rights Act 1998.
which is common to all is evidence of the fact that that there is no morally right approach. On the contrary, the diverse practices of cultures are dictated by custom which is ‗king of all'.
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The decision of the Court of Appeal in Ghai that an outdoor funeral pyre (within a
walled enclosure, open to the sun) is permitted, is good news for Hindus, Sikhs, and anyone else who wishes their mortal remains to be cremated in this way. No doubt it was with great relief that the judges in the Court of Appeal, having ascertained that such an arrangement would satisfy Mr Ghai's beliefs, were able to resolve the issue through traditional methods of statutory construction, rather than having to tussle with the delicate task of balancing the religious faith of the minority against the supposed offense caused to the sensibilities of the majority.
What is disturbing about the litigation, however, is the readiness of the Administrative 
